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It is often argued that internationally recognized human rights 
are common to all cultural traditions and adaptable to a great variety of social structures 
and political regimes. Such arguments confuse human rights with human dignity. All 
societies possess conceptions of human dignity, but the conception of human dignity 
underlying international human rights standards requires a particular type of "liberal" 
regime. This conclusion is reached through a comparison of the social structures of ideal 
type liberal, minimal, traditional, communist, corporatist and developmental regimes 
and their impact on autonomy, equality, privacy, social conflict, and the definition of 
societal membership. 
T he international 
human rights elaborated in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the In- 
ternational Human Rights Covenants 
often are held to be compatible with a 
great variety of political regimes. For ex- 
ample, Khushalani (1983, p. 404) argues 
that "the concept of human rights can be 
traced to the origin of the human race 
itself," and that "all the philosophies of 
our time" are committed to human rights. 
Likewise, Graefrath (1983, p. 6) argues 
that international human rights standards 
"can be adapted to any legal system" (cf. 
Buultjens, 1980; Gros Espiell, 1979; Mara- 
singhe, 1984; Mojekwu, 1980; Pollis, 
1982; Ruffin, 1982; Stackhouse, 1984; 
Wiarda, 1982). We argue, however, that 
international human rights standards are 
based on a distinctive substantive concep- 
tion of human dignity. They therefore re- 
quire a particular type of "liberal" regime, 
which may be institutionalized in various 
forms, but only within a relatively nar- 
row range of variation. The authors cited 
above confuse human rights with human 
dignity. 
"Human dignity" figures prominently 
in international human rights documents; 
for example, the International Human 
Rights Covenants proclaim that human 
rights "derive from the inherent dignity of 
the human person" (1966). Furthermore, 
every form of political regime implicitly 
reflects a particular social conception of 
human dignity. Nonetheless, human 
rights and human dignity are quite 
distinct notions. 
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Conceptions of human dignity, in their 
social and political aspects, express par- 
ticular understandings of the inner 
(moral) nature and worth of the human 
person and his or her proper (political) 
relations with society. Human rights, by 
contrast, are the equal and inalienable 
rights, in the strong sense of entitlements 
that ground particularly powerful claims 
against the state, that each person has 
simply as a human being. Human rights 
are a particular social practice that aims 
to realize a distinctive substantive concep- 
tion of human dignity (Donnelly, 1982a). 
Conceptions of human dignity vary dra- 
matically across societies, and most of 
these variations are incompatible with the 
values of equality and autonomy that 
underlie human rights. Most regimes- 
and their underlying social conceptions of 
human dignity-necessarily deny both 
the idea and the practice of human rights. 
In order to examine the relations be- 
tween human rights and conceptions of 
human dignity across a wide range of 
regimes, our analysis relies heavily on the 
use of ideal types-"the construction of 
certain elements of reality into a logically 
precise conception" (Weber, 1946, p. 
59)-especially ideal-type conceptions of 
the human person and his or her obliga- 
tions to and claims upon society and the 
state. We first specify the philosophical 
and structural connections between the 
"liberal" conception of human dignity and 
the principle and practice of human 
rights. Then we show how four major 
contemporary regime types, which we 
call communitarian, necessarily repudiate 
human rights because of their commit- 
ment to alternative social conceptions of 
human dignity. 
The particular interpretation of liberal- 
ism we adopt provides the philosophical 
and structural basis for international 
human rights norms. This is not a paper 
on liberal theory. In another context we 
would argue for the authenticity of our in- 
terpretation, but here we claim only that 
it is a plausible, standard reading of the 
liberal tradition. Our subject in this article 
is human rights, not liberalism. There- 
fore, even if our definition should prove 
to be stipulative, the substance of our 
argument, which focuses on the social and 
political requirements of human rights, 
would remain largely unaffected. 
We should also note that we do not join 
arguments about the content of lists of 
human rights. Instead, as is common in 
the human rights literature, we accept the 
list in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights without argument. In par- 
ticular, we avoid rehashing old arguments 
about economic and social rights. Both on 
theoretical grounds (see Donnelly, 1982b; 
Donnelly, 1985, ch. 6; Shue, 1980, pt. 1). 
and in light of the nearly universal official 
acceptance of the Universal Declaration, 
we adopt the full list of rights it provides, 
with civil, political, economic, and social 
rights on an equal footing. 
While these two simplifying assump- 
tions narrow our focus, our argument re- 
mains significant and controversial. We 
contend that internationally recognized 
human rights require a liberal regime. 
Other types of regimes, and the concep- 
tions of human dignity on which they 
rest, may be defensible on other moral or 
political grounds, but they will not stand 
up to scrutiny under the standard of 
human rights. 
Liberalism and Human Rights: 
A Necessary Connection 
Liberalism, Equality, 
and Personal Autonomy 
We follow Ronald Dworkin (1977, ch. 
12; 1985, ch. 8) in arguing that the heart 
of liberalism is expressed in the basic pol- 
itical right to equal concern and respect: 
Government must treat those whom it governs 
with concern, that is, as human beings who are 
capable of suffering and frustration, and with 
respect, that is, as human beings who are capable 
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of forming and acting on intelligent conceptions 
of how their lives should be lived. Government 
must not only treat people with concern and 
respect, but with equal concern and respect. It 
must not distribute goods or opportunities un- 
equally on the ground that some citizens are en- 
titled to more because they are worthy of more 
concern. It must not constrain liberty on the 
ground that one citizen's conception of the good 
life . . . is nobler or superior to another's. 
(Dworkin, 1977, p. 273) 
The state must treat each person as a 
moral and political equal-not assure 
each an equal share of social resources, 
but treat all with equal concern and 
respect. Inequalities in goods or oppor- 
tunities that arise directly or indirectly 
from political decisions-and many such 
inequalities are easily justified within a 
liberal regime-must be compatible with 
the right to equal concern and respect. 
Personal liberty, especially the liberty 
to choose and lead one's own life, clearly 
is entailed by the principle of equal 
respect: for the state to interfere in mat- 
ters of personal morality would be to treat 
the life plans and values of some as 
superior to others. A certain amount of 
economic liberty is also required, at least 
to the extent that decisions concerning 
consumption, investment, and risk reflect 
free decisions based on personal values 
that arise from autonomously chosen con- 
ceptions of the good life. Liberty alone, 
however, cannot serve as the overriding 
value of social life, as the end to be max- 
imized by political association. 
Liberty readily degenerates into license 
and social atomization unless checked by 
a fairly expansive, positive conception of 
the persons in relation to whom it is exer- 
cised. If liberty is to foster dignity, it must 
be exercised within the constraints of the 
principle of equal concern and respect. In 
fact, autonomy and equality are less a 
pair of guiding principles than different 
manifestations of the central liberal com- 
mitment to the equal worth and dignity of 
each and every person. 
Each human being is of equal moral 
worth individually, whatever his or her 
social utility. Individuals-regardless of 
who they are or where they stand-have 
an inherent dignity and moral worth that 
the state must not merely passively 
respect, but for which it must demon- 
strate an active concern. Furthermore, 
everyone is entitled to this equal concern 
and respect. Minimum standards of polit- 
ical treatment are embodied in (human) 
rights; they are not merely desirable goals 
of social policy. This implies a particular 
conception of the relation of the indi- 
vidual to the community and the state. 
Man is a social animal; human poten- 
tial, and even personal individuality, can 
be developed and expressed only in a 
social context. Society requires the 
discharge of certain political functions, 
and large-scale political organization re- 
quires the state. However, the state-es- 
pecially the modern state-also presents 
particularly serious threats to human dig- 
nity. The state is easily turned to the 
denial of equal concern and respect, 
through the enforcement of a particular 
vision of the good life or the entrench- 
ment of privileged inequality. Therefore, 
human rights have a special reference to 
the state, in order to keep it an instrument 
to realize, rather than undermine, equal 
concern and respect. In the inevitable con- 
flicts between the individual and the state, 
the liberal gives prima facie priority, in 
the areas protected by human rights, to 
the individual. 
For the liberal, the individual is not 
merely separable from the community 
and social roles, but specially valued 
precisely as a distinctive, discrete in- 
dividual-which is why each person must 
be treated with equal concern and respect. 
The state and society are conceived, in 
more or less contractarian terms, as forms 
of association for the fuller unfolding of 
human potential, through the exercise and 
enjoyment of human rights. Human dig- 
nity, for the liberal, is largely encom- 
passed in the vision of life as an equal and 
autonomous member of society, enjoying 
a full range of human rights. 
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This liberal view of man is rooted in 
structural changes that began to emerge in 
late medieval and early modern Europe, 
gained particular force in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries, and today are 
increasingly the norm throughout the 
world. The "creation" of the private in- 
dividual separate from society is closely 
linked to the rise of a new, more complex 
division of labor, the resulting changes in 
class structure (particularly the rise and 
then dominance of the bourgeoisie), and a 
new vision of the individual's relationship 
to God, society, and the state. 
These developments are well known, 
and need not be recounted here. For our 
purposes, though, it is important to stress 
that in the social changes of moderniza- 
tion-especially migration, urbanization, 
and technological development-the all- 
encompassing moral whole of traditional 
or feudal society was replaced by a much 
more segmented social order. In par- 
ticular, politics was separated from 
religion, the economy, and law, which 
were likewise separated from one 
another. Individuals, too, were separated 
from society as a whole; no longer could 
persons be reduced to their roles, to parts 
of the community. With separate in- 
dividuals, possessing special worth and 
dignity precisely as individuals, the basis 
for human rights was established. 
Occurring parallel to these changes in 
society was the equally well-known 
development of the modern state. The 
new bourgeois class was initially a prin- 
cipal backer of the newly rising princes 
and kings and their states; both shared an 
interest in freeing themselves from the 
constraints of the old feudal order. 
However, as the modern state's power 
grew, it increasingly threatened the in- 
dividual citizen. Bourgeois "freemen" 
began to demand, therefore, that they in- 
deed be free. Such demands eventually 
took the form of arguments for the 
universal natural rights and equality of all 
men. In the new socially mobile society, 
in which entrance to and exit from the 
bourgeois class was relatively unpredic- 
table, a new set of privileges could not 
readily be reserved for a new elite defined 
by birth or some similar characteristic. 
Rather, in order that some (the bour- 
geoisie) might be able to exercise these 
new rights, they had to be guaranteed for 
all. 
Thus, human rights came to be articu- 
lated primarily as claims of any individual 
against the state. Human rights lay down 
the basic form of the relationship be- 
tween the (new, modern) individual and 
the (new, modern) state, a relationship 
based on the prima facie priority of the in- 
dividual over the state in those areas pro- 
tected by human rights. Human rights are 
viewed as (morally) prior to and above 
society and the state, and under the con- 
trol of individuals, who hold them and 
may exercise them against the state in ex- 
treme cases. This reflects not only the 
equality of all individuals, but also their 
autonomy-their right to have and pur- 
sue interests and goals different from 
those of the state or its rulers. In the areas 
and endeavors protected by human 
rights, the individual is "king," or rather, 
an equal and autonomous person entitled 
to equal concern and respect. 
In practice, of course, these values and 
structural changes remain incompletely 
realized even today, and for most of the 
modern era they have been restricted to a 
small segment of the population. None- 
theless, the ideal was established and its 
implementation begun. Even if the de- 
mand for human rights began as a tactic 
of the bourgeoisie to protect its own class 
interests, the logic of universal, inalien- 
able personal rights has long since broken 
free of these origins. 
Furthermore, while these processes of 
sociopolitical individuation and state 
building were first played out in Europe, 
they are increasingly the rule throughout 
the world. As a result, the structural basis 
for a society of equal and autonomous in- 
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dividuals is being universalized. Social 
structure today increasingly parallels the 
near universal diffusion of the idea of 
human rights and the philosophical claim 
that human rights are universal. In- 
dividual human rights, therefore, increas- 
ingly appear not merely as moral ideals, 
but as both objectively and subjectively 
necessary to protect and realize human 
dignity (cf. Howard, 1986). 
Liberalism and International 
Human Rights 
The standard list of human rights in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
can be easily derived from the liberal con- 
ception of the individual and the state. 
Other lists, of course, have been and may 
be derived from these principles, but we 
would argue that the near perfect fit be- 
tween liberalism and the Universal 
Declaration reflects a deep and essential 
theoretical connection. 
To be treated with concern and respect, 
whether equal or unequal, requires prior 
recognition of the individual as a moral 
and legal person, which in turn requires 
certain basic personal rights. Rights to 
recognition before the law and to nation- 
ality (Universal Declaration, Articles 6, 
15) are prerequisites to political treatment 
as a person. In a somewhat different vein, 
the right to life, as well as rights to protec- 
tion against slavery, torture, and other in- 
human or degrading treatment (Articles 3, 
4, 5) are essential to recognition and 
respect as a person. 
Rights such as freedoms of speech, con- 
science, religion, and association (Articles 
18, 19) protect a sphere of personal auton- 
omy. The right to privacy (Article 12) 
even more explicitly aims to guarantee the 
capacity to realize personal visions of a 
life worthy of a human being. Personal 
autonomy also requires economic and 
social rights, such as the right to educa- 
tion (Article 26), which provides the in- 
tellectual resources for informed autono- 
mous choices and the skills needed to act 
on them, and the right to participate in 
the cultural life of the community (Article 
27), which recognizes the social and 
cultural dimensions of personal develop- 
ment. In its political dimension, equal 
respect also implies democratic control of 
the state, and thus rights to vote and to 
freedoms of (political) speech, press, 
assembly, and association (Articles 19, 
20, 21). 
The principle of equal concern and 
respect also requires the government to 
intervene to reduce social and economic 
inequalities that deny equal personal 
worth. The state must actively intervene 
to protect those who, as a result of natural 
or voluntary membership in an unpopular 
group, are subject to social, political, or 
economic discrimination that limits their 
access to a fair share of social resources or 
opportunities. Rights such as equal pro- 
tection of the laws and protection against 
discrimination on such bases as race, col- 
or, sex, language, religion, opinion, 
origin, property, birth, or status (Articles 
2, 7) are essential to assure that all people 
are treated as fully and equally human. 
In the economic sphere, the traditional 
liberal attachment to the market is not ac- 
cidental: quite aside from its economic ef- 
ficiency, the market places minimal 
restraints on economic liberty, and thus 
maximizes personal autonomy. However, 
market distribution of resources can have 
grossly unequal outcomes. Inequality per 
se is not objectionable to the liberal, but 
the principle of equal concern and respect 
does imply a floor of basic economic 
welfare; degrading inequalities (Shue, 
1980, pp. 119-23) cannot be permitted. 
The state also has an appropriate interest 
in redressing market-generated inequali- 
ties because a "free market" system of 
distributing resources is actively backed 
by the state, which protects and enforces 
property rights. 
Differential market rewards are not 
neutral; they reward morally equal in- 
dividuals unequally. Market distributions 
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may be substantially affected by such 
morally irrelevant factors as race, sex, 
class, or religion, while many of the 
"talents" richly rewarded by the market 
are of dubious moral significance. Even 
"achieved" inequalities, should they 
threaten the (moral) equality or auton- 
omy of other citizens, present at least a 
prima facie case for state intervention. 
The principle of equal concern and respect 
requires the state to act positively to 
cancel unjustifiable market inequalities, at 
least to the point that all are assured a 
minimum share of resources through the 
implementation of social and economic 
rights. In human rights terms, this im- 
plies, for example, rights to food, health 
care, and social insurance (Articles 22, 
25). 
Efforts to alleviate degrading or disre- 
spectful misery and deprivation do not ex- 
haust the scope of the economic demands 
of the principle of equal concern and 
respect. The right to work (Article 23), 
which is essentially a right to economic 
participation, is of especially great impor- 
tance. It has considerable intrinsic value: 
work is essential to a life of dignity, in- 
sofar as man is conceived as homo faber. 
It also has great instrumental value, both 
for the satisfaction of basic material needs 
and for providing a secure and dignified 
economic foundation from which to pur- 
sue personal values and objectives. A 
(limited) right to property (Article 17) can 
be justified in similar terms. 
Finally, the special threat to personal 
autonomy and equality presented by the 
modern state requires a set of legal rights 
such as the presumption of innocence and 
rights to due process, fair and public hear- 
ings before an independent tribunal, and 
protection from arbitrary arrest, deten- 
tion, or exile (Articles 8-11). More 
broadly, the special threat to dignity 
posed by the state is reflected in the fact 
that all human rights are held particularly 
against the state. Moreover, they hold 
against all types of states, democratic as 
much as any other: if one's government 
treats one as less than fully human, it mat- 
ters little, if at all, how that government 
came to power. The individual of course 
has social duties (Article 29), but the 
discharge of social obligations is not a 
precondition for having or exercising 
human rights. 
We have thus moved from the liberal 
principle of equal concern and respect to 
the full list of human rights in the Univer- 
sal Declaration. These rights, in turn, 
demand-and if implemented would play 
a crucial role in creating-a liberal soci- 
ety, and the ideal person envisioned by 
liberalism (cf. Donnelly, 1985, ch. 3). It 
would be equally simple to work back 
from the Universal Declaration to the 
principle of equal concern and respect. In 
fact, the association between liberalism 
and human rights runs so deep that the 
realization of human rights is the prin- 
cipal liberal standard for evaluating the 
achievements, and even the legitimacy, of 
any regime (cf. Donnelly, 1985, pp. 
69-73). 
Liberalism vs. the Minimal State 
In practice, obviously, even the best of 
actual liberal regimes fall short of the 
ideal we have been discussing, and the 
human rights records of many self- 
professed liberal societies merit severe 
criticism. Furthermore, many avowed 
liberals view liberty and equality as 
largely antagonistic principles to be 
traded off against one another, rather 
than as complementary dimensions of the 
single principle of equal concern and 
respect. One way to make this tradeoff is 
to choose liberty and disregard equality, 
establishing a "minimal" or "nightwatch- 
man" regime. 
Advocates of the minimal state (e.g., 
Nozick, 1974) would largely limit the 
state to protecting public order and 
private property. To assure the good 
behavior of the nightwatchman, "nega- 
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tive" civil and political rights are also re- 
quired, especially civil liberties, narrowly 
conceived as rights to public noninter- 
ference in the private lives (very broadly 
understood) of individuals. Yet minimal- 
ism also explicitly protects property rights 
while rejecting economic and social 
human rights. Beyond minimalism's ob- 
vious incompatibility with international 
human rights standards (which minimal- 
ists readily allow), its deep commitment 
to protecting private property while deny- 
ing all other economic and social rights 
borders on logical contradiction; we can 
see no way that precisely and only this 
one economic right can justifiably be 
allowed on the minimalist's list of human 
rights. 
The standard rights-based (i.e., not 
merely utilitarian) arguments for the right 
to private property in such contexts rest 
on the importance of guaranteed private 
economic activity, and resources for the 
enjoyment of personal autonomy. 
Clearly, however, such an argument does 
not justify a right to unlimited individual 
accumulation: at a certain point, addi- 
tional economic resources contribute 
nothing at all to personal autonomy, and 
long before that point the marginal return 
becomes vanishingly small. Even more 
importantly, exactly the same argument 
can be made for other social and 
economic rights. In fact, a substantially 
stronger case can be made for rights to 
work, a minimum standard of living, and 
health care. 
In any case, the minimal state is almost 
certain to be self-destructing if it recog- 
nizes equal, universal civil and political 
rights. The denial of political participa- 
tion usually rests on a desire to protect 
social and economic privilege, while those 
previously excluded from political partici- 
pation tend to use their newly acquired 
power to obtain a fair, or at least a 
tolerable, share of social resources (cf. 
Goldstein, 1983). The emergence of the 
Western welfare state and popular 
pressure throughout the Third World for 
social services clearly suggests that im- 
plementing equal, universal political 
rights will transform a minimal regime. 
The only way to avoid this would be to 
entrench a right to private property 
against the exercise of all other human 
rights. This is obviously unjustifiable; no 
plausible theory of human nature or 
dignity yields this one right as superior to 
all other human rights. However, lesser 
entrenchment, allowing redistribution 
beyond a certain level of accumulation, 
would be ineffective. If the point beyond 
which redistribution would take place 
were set democratically, a minimal regime 
would almost certainly be democratically 
abolished, or at least dismantled over 
time. Any other way of setting the limit, 
however, would deny the equality of 
political rights. 
In other words, the minimal state, in its 
very essence, is a violator of human 
rights, even within the limits of its own 
terms of reference. Liberalism's dual pur- 
suit of autonomy and equality is replaced 
in minimalism by a single-minded pursuit 
of autonomy understood largely as the 
social guarantee of the broadest possible 
sphere of private action, virtually irre- 
spective of its social consequences. For the 
minimalist, human dignity is expressed 
principally in the unequal, achieved con- 
sequences of private, largely conflictual, 
action. 
The minimal state thus is not the pure 
form of liberalism it is often represented 
to be by both minimalists and various lef- 
tist critics of liberalism. Rather, it is a 
perverse and internally inconsistent nar- 
rowing of liberalism that is also inconsis- 
tent with international human rights stan- 
dards. 
Equality, Autonomy and 
Communitarian Societies 
Having shown that human rights and 
liberal regimes are closely matched, it re- 
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mains to be shown that other types of 
regimes are incompatible with the 
demands of human rights, a task that we 
have begun with the discussion above of 
the minimal state. In this section we ex- 
amine four major types of communitarian 
society, which together encompass the 
vast majority of contemporary nonliberal 
regimes. 
We define communitarian societies as 
those that give ideological and practical 
priority to the community (sometimes 
embodied in the state) over the in- 
dividual. Such societies regard their 
members as worthy of concern and 
respect, but only as members of society 
performing prescribed roles. Their con- 
cepts of human dignity, therefore, are not 
rooted in the notion of human rights. 
Communitarian societies are antithetical 
to the implementation and maintenance 
of human rights, because they deny the 
autonomy of the individual, the irre- 
ducible moral equality of all individuals, 
and the possibility of conflict between the 
community's interests and the legitimate 
interests of any individual. 
Traditional Societies 
Traditional societies are communal, 
status-based societies, governed accord- 
ing to principles and practices held to be 
fixed by tradition. They are usually eth- 
nically homogeneous and agricultural, 
and frequently stateless. In traditional 
society, one's worth, rights, and responsi- 
bilities arise from and remain tied to dif- 
ferential membership in a particular soci- 
ety, with unequal, status-based privileges 
and duties resting on age, sex, caste, or 
other ascriptive hierarchies. The idea that 
one is entitled to equal concern and 
respect and a wide range of inalienable 
personal rights simply because one is a 
human being is utterly foreign to tradi- 
tional societies. Only certain kinds of peo- 
ple are defined as moral persons, that is, 
human beings. 
Although most people in traditional 
societies have at least some rights and 
privileges, these are contingent on the 
proper fulfillment of social roles, rather 
than basic personal rights held against 
society. Even within the recognized social 
boundaries, some people may be defined 
as outsiders, as nonbelievers are defined 
in strict Islamic societies, or ethnic 
strangers in traditional Africa. The rela- 
tionship between the individual (if he or 
she may be so called) and society is by 
definition nonconflictual; everyone's in- 
terests are incorporated into the higher 
value system represented by the political- 
religious-legal decision makers. Man and 
society are assumed to be inseparable. 
The very idea of inalienable individual 
rights held equally by all against the com- 
munity is, if comprehensible, likely to be 
viewed with horror (cf. Legesse, 1980, p. 
124). 
In traditional societies, there is no no- 
tion of the autonomous individual. One's 
worth, even one's existence, is defined by 
one's place, one's role in the community; 
apart from the community, one does not 
exist, or at least such an existence is 
largely without moral value. One's dig- 
nity-which usually is conceived pri- 
marily as an attribute of one's kinship, 
age, sex, or occupational group-is ob- 
tained or validated by discharging the 
(traditionally defined) duties of one's sta- 
tion, rather than by autonomously 
creating or unfolding a unique individual 
existence. In traditional society, there are 
neither human beings, in the relevant 
moral sense, nor equal, inalienable, and 
universal rights. 
Many traditional societies were slave or 
caste societies; few were subject to demo- 
cratic control in even a very loose sense of 
that term. Individual deviations from 
communal norms usually were harshly 
repressed, and women and outsiders 
usually were treated as inferior beings. 
Nonetheless, in theory at least, and often 
in practice as well, a certain sort of dig- 
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nity, tied to the proper fulfillment of 
social roles, could be achieved by most 
people. Furthermore, social responsibili- 
ties usually were coupled with reciprocal 
social and economic protections. In tradi- 
tional societies most people had a defined, 
secure, and (within its own terms) digni- 
fied place in society. 
Therefore, one can at least understand, 
and perhaps even contextually justify, 
traditional society's denial of human 
rights. One might even argue that the 
traditional conception of human dignity is 
superior to that of liberalism. For exam- 
ple, it might be argued that most people 
prefer regulated, secure social roles, with 
their concomitant sense of belonging, to 
autonomy and its attendant insecurities. 
Insider "individuals" may well have fared 
better in many ways as part of traditional 
society than as, say, a textile worker in 
mid-nineteenth century England or South 
Korea today. 
Such arguments, however, are not 
human rights arguments. To defend tradi- 
tional society is to reject a society based 
on equal, inalienable, universal personal 
rights in favor of a status-based society. 
To prefer traditional society to liberalism 
is to reject a society of equal and 
autonomous individuals with inalienable 
personal rights in favor of a society of 
unequal, regulated occupants of social 
roles, incorporated into the community. 
Traditional society and human rights can- 
not be combined without violence to both 
(cf. Donnelly, 1982a and Howard, 1986, 
ch. 2). 
Communism 
By communism we mean an ideal type 
regime modeled on the structure and of- 
ficial ideology of contemporary Soviet 
bloc countries. The key feature of such 
societies is a communist party-state com- 
mitted to total, revolutionary transforma- 
tion of social and personal life. The con- 
nection between such regimes and the 
writings of Marx or the "authentic" Marx- 
ist tradition is an issue that cannot, and 
certainly need not, be addressed here. 
Our concern instead is with the frequently 
encountered argument that communist 
regimes are entirely consistent with inter- 
national human rights norms. 
While there are striking similarities be- 
tween traditional and communist soci- 
eties, especially in the submergence of the 
individual to the community (state) and in 
the use of social (class) roles to define in- 
dividual worth, there are no less striking 
differences. Traditional societies have at 
most a rudimentary state apparatus, 
whereas in communist societies the state is 
the central social institution, despite 
ideologically obligatory references to its 
withering away. Rather than the often 
more or less face-to-face relations of small 
traditional society, communist societies 
range in size from millions to over a 
billion people. Instead of a relatively sim- 
ple division of labor, they have a complex 
industrial division of labor, and rather 
than an ethnically homogeneous com- 
munity, often bound together by real or 
mythic kinship ties, most communist 
countries are multi-ethnic. 
This alters the entire texture of social 
relations. The communist state simply 
cannot be the functional equivalent of the 
traditional community; it necessarily ap- 
pears as a distant, separate institution, in- 
capable of providing the social and psy- 
chological support of close-knit tradi- 
tional communities. Therefore, being sub- 
sumed into the "community" is quite a 
different process in communist societies. 
While in traditional society the individ- 
ual is never fully differentiated from the 
group, in communist societies individuals 
have been thoroughly differentiated. The 
modern economy, with its complex divi- 
sion of labor and extensive role- 
segmentation, necessarily produces 
economically, and thus socially, distinct 
individuals, and state bureaucracies are 
structured to deal (only) with (anony- 
mous or interchangeable) individuals. 
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The political task for communist regimes, 
therefore, is to reabsorb the individual 
into the (state) society. The primacy of 
the state/society therefore must be polit- 
ically created-as is underscored by the 
very project of revolutionary social 
transformation. One must be made a part 
of the community in communist societies. 
However, since the basic socioeco- 
nomic organization of life under com- 
munism continues to reproducee differen- 
tiated individuals, the process of (re)in- 
corporation must be constantly repeated. 
Undifferentiated economic reincorpora- 
tion is impossible, however, and 
ideological reincorporation, no matter 
how hegemonic, is insufficient. Direct 
political coercion, therefore, is a feature 
of communist collectivism that generally 
is absent from traditional society (because 
of the effectiveness of other means of 
social control). 
As the task of the state/party/prole- 
tariat is to transform all aspects of social 
existence, private life is not merely subject 
to public regulation, but must be made 
public, and regulated by the state, if the 
revolution is to succeed. Those who 
follow a bourgeois or otherwise reac- 
tionary road are entitled to neither respect 
nor concern; at best they are ignored, and 
more often they are actively repressed. As 
one East German scholar states, "there is 
no freedom for enemies of the people" 
(Klenner, 1984, p. 15), who are defined as 
social outsiders. Such a belief readily 
leads to the identification and repression 
of pariah social classes and, in extreme 
cases, class-based "genocide" directed 
against kulaks or similar class enemies 
(Kuper, 1981, pp. 99-100). 
The ethnic homogeneity of traditional 
society is replaced by class homogeniza- 
tion. "Class position," however, means 
simply conformity to behavioral norms 
specified by the state. Equality, rather 
than a fundamental and inviolable moral 
fact, is reduced to mere social sameness. 
In communist societies, one is equal not 
by birth or by nature, but only to the ex- 
tent that one is essentially indistinguish- 
able from one's fellow communist citi- 
zens, an embodiment of the new com- 
munist man. Communist societies thus 
produce a distinctive sort of homogen- 
ized, de-individualized person. 
Communist societies obviously must 
violate a wide range of civil and political 
rights during the revolutionary transition, 
and necessarily, not merely as a matter of 
unfortunate excesses in practice. Even 
after communism is achieved, the denial 
of civil and political rights remains 
necessary to preserve the achievements of 
the revolution. The permanent denial of 
civil and political rights is required by the 
commitment to build society according to 
a particular substantive vision, for the ex- 
ercise of personal autonomy and civil and 
political rights is almost certain to under- 
mine that vision. 
Furthermore, communist regimes, for 
all their achievements in providing 
economic and social goods and services, 
are fundamentally incompatible with 
economic and social rights. In communist 
societies, the possession and enjoyment of 
all rights are contingent on the discharge 
of social duties. For example, Article 59 of 
the Soviet Constitution (1977) states that 
"the exercise of rights and liberties is in- 
separable from the performance by citi- 
zens of their duties" (cf. Burlatsky, 1982; 
Egorov, 1979, p. 39). Thus, for example, 
access to higher education and desirable 
jobs is closely linked to political connec- 
tions or behavior. Few rights of any sort 
are secure in such a regime, and no human 
rights, in the strong sense of equal and in- 
alienable entitlements of all individuals, 
can be recognized. 
It is important to stress the difference 
between having a human right and merely 
enjoying the substance of a right; be- 
tween, for example, having food and hav- 
ing a right to food, or speaking freely and 
enjoying a right to free speech. In com- 
munist (and other communitarian) socie- 
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ties, one may be guaranteed the substance 
of certain human rights (Shue, 1980, pp. 
75-76)-that is, goods, services, and op- 
portunities may be enjoyed. They are not, 
however, enjoyed as rights; those who 
conform receive certain benefits, but the 
state may freely bestow or withdraw these 
as it sees fit (cf. Donnelly, 1985, pp. 
11-12, 52-53, 77-80). This is as true of 
economic and social rights as civil and 
political rights. One is not entitled to 
these benefits simply as a human being, 
one does not have the special control pro- 
vided by possession of a right, and one's 
claims to enjoy these benefits do not have 
the force of human rights. 
In communist regimes, in fact, even as a 
citizen one is entitled to nothing from the 
state: "Human rights . . . do not exist 
outside the state or against the state. The 
state is their creator" (Lopatka, 1979, p. 7; 
cf. Weichelt, 1979, p. 3). Rights are ac- 
quired only by the discharge of class 
obligations, as defined by the state 
(Lieberam, 1979, p. 14). Social outsiders, 
such as landowners or the bourgeoisie, 
may lose not only their former property 
rights, but also all other rights. 
Communist society thus rests on a 
social utilitarianism fundamentally in- 
compatible with human rights. The good 
of society, as determined by the state/ 
party, always takes precedence over all 
else. Because individual "rights" must 
always yield to social purposes, as enun- 
ciated by the state, such "rights" are 
worthless; no matter what the state does, 
it cannot be held guilty of violating them. 
Whatever the benefits and opportunities 
citizens may (contingently) receive-and 
they are undeniably substantial in some 
communist regimes-communism repre- 
sents a thorough denial of human rights. 
Corporatism 
Corporatism, a principal form of con- 
temporary right-wing regimes, can be 
defined as 
a system of interest representation in which the 
constituent units are organized into a limited 
number of single, compulsory, non-competitive, 
hierarchically ordered and functionally differen- 
tiated categories, recognized or licensed (if not 
created) by the state and granted a deliberate 
representational monopoly within their respec- 
tive categories in exchange for observing certain 
controls on their selection of leaders and articula- 
tion of demands and support. (Schmitter, 1974, 
pp. 93-94) 
Corporatist regimes present themselves 
as neutral instruments to regulate and 
mediate the antithetical interests of labor 
and capital, with other groups-such as 
women and youth-often officially or- 
ganized and incorporated into the pol- 
itical structure as well, further under- 
cutting basic structural conflicts. In prac- 
tice, however, class rule is unambiguously 
at the heart of corporatism. The essential 
purpose of its ideology and political struc- 
ture is to prevent further class conflict and 
entrench the extant economic hierarchy. 
The state proclaims the equal dignity of 
all segments of society. Meanwhile, une- 
qual private power and property accumu- 
late. Workers and peasants are not neces- 
sarily excluded from a share of social 
benefits-for example, state controlled 
trade unions may be allowed to pursue 
certain improvements in working condi- 
tions or living standards, so long as class 
conflicts are denied-but they benefit 
only inadvertently or as a side-payment 
to co-opt potential opponents of the rul- 
ing corporate coalition. Equal concern 
and respect is at best ignored. 
One variant of corporatism, which can 
be called authoritarianism for want of a 
better term, preserves an important 
sphere of private autonomy and activity. 
Religion and education, for example, may 
be left as a private matter. This privacy, 
however, is only a realm of public indif- 
ference. It is quite different from positive 
respect for or protection of a right to 
privacy and related human rights. Pri- 
vacy (of thought, religion, belief) is not so 
much protected in authoritarian regimes 
as it is ignored-and it is ignored only as 
811 
American Political Science Review Vol. 80 
long as it does not interfere with the basic 
corporatist bargain. Personal autonomy 
is, at best, not a right but a contingent 
benefit. 
The fascist variant of corporatism, 
however, is actively hostile to the private. 
In reaction to what it views as the un- 
abated individualism of liberal society, 
fascism proclaims a romantic ideology of 
(mythic) consensus, homogeneity, and 
personal comfort in conforming to social 
roles. Human dignity is to be achieved 
through integration into an all- 
encompassing moral order, represented 
by the fascist state. Much as in com- 
munism, any challenge to this order, in- 
cluding deviation in personal values and 
beliefs, is treated as a threat to the entire 
social fabric. 
This ideology of the primacy of the 
state readily leads to terror and scape- 
goating. Nonviolent denials of civil and 
political right are likely to be inadequate 
to prevent independent "political" activ- 
ity, now redefined to include much of 
"private" personal life. Direct terror is 
likely to be necessary; so also is the crea- 
tion and persecution of outsider or scape- 
goat groups, in extreme cases culminating 
in genocide. Such persecution not only 
allows the state to displace real social ten- 
sions arising from the corporatist 
character of society, but, in the very 
denial of the rights of the scapegoat 
group, reaffirms the unity of the fascist in- 
dividual, society, and state. 
From a human rights perspective, 
however, fascism is merely the extreme 
form of corporatism; fascism may ac- 
tively violate more rights, but authori- 
tarian corporatism is unlikely to protect 
many more. One cannot even assuredly 
say that life is preferable for the average 
individual in authoritarian corporatism; 
for example, if public indifference results 
in anomie, the intense feeling of belonging 
espoused by fascism may seem preferable, 
at least for insiders. In any case, authori- 
tarian corporatism's public indifference to 
the bulk of society is certainly a denial of 
equal concern, while its denial of inde- 
pendent political action is incompatible 
with equal respect. Whatever the form, 
corporatism denies inherent personal dig- 
nity and equal concern and respect in the 
very bargain that defines the regime. 
Development Dictatorship 
One further type of communitarian 
regime, which we call development dicta- 
torship, should be briefly noted. In 
development dictatorships, the principal 
resource of the ruling elite is control of the 
means of coercion, justified in the name of 
the most rapid possible economic devel- 
opment. Development, which has 
achieved an unprecedented ideological 
hegemony in the Third World, is easily 
presented as the moral equivalent of war, 
requiring the subordination of the in- 
dividual to the state. Therefore, in the 
hands of repressive elites it nicely justifies 
a wide range of human rights violations, 
especially since the connection between 
particular violations and underlying 
development goals is likely to be at best 
very loosely defined. 
Development dictatorship is distin- 
guished from corporatism or communism 
in large measure by its class structure. In 
development dictatorships, economic 
class position is less the source of power 
than the result of control of the state. In 
nationalized economies, the organiza- 
tional (Markovitz, 1977, ch. 6) or bureau- 
cratic (Shivji, 1976, pt. 3) "bourgeoisie" is 
composed of occupants of high-level of- 
fice in the military, the government, the 
bureaucracy, or the ruling party. A 
parasitic private bourgeoisie, essentially 
living off its economic relations with the 
state, may also exist. Controlled by 
members of these various elites, who have 
few resources other than coercion to 
maintain their power, development dicta- 
torships frequently degenerate in cycles of 
coups and countercoups, or, once stabil- 
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ized, evolve into some sort of corporatist 
regime. The regime rests lightly on top of 
society, rather than being a political 
representation of deep underlying socio- 
economic forces (cf. Hyden, 1983, ch. 2). 
Even where the regime's commitment to 
development is genuine, rather than 
merely a cover for elite depredations-so 
that there is an attempt to provide the 
substance of some economic and social 
rights-enshrining development as an 
overriding social objective assures that in- 
dividuals and their rights will regularly be 
ignored. The value put on privacy tends 
to be low, as private goals might interfere 
with national development goals. The 
identification of "outsiders," economic 
saboteurs, or similar scapegoat groups is a 
common diversionary tactic when devel- 
opment plans fail. Full personal dignity is 
conceived largely as an abstract future 
good, to be realized only after success in 
the struggle for development. In general, 
individual human rights, especially rights 
against the state, the essential agent of 
development, must wait until develop- 
ment has been achieved. Once more, we 
are faced with a choice between human 
rights and alternative social goals based 
on a radically different conception of 
human dignity. 
Communitarianism and the Impossibility 
of Human Rights 
Whether communitarianism is forward 
or backward looking, it is structurally, 
ideologically, and philosophically incom- 
patible with human rights. The view of 
human dignity found in all communitar- 
ian societies is that the individual realizes 
himself as part of the group by unques- 
tioningly filling his social role or being 
loyal to the state. This conception of 
human dignity is incompatible with 
human rights. 
At the core of this incompatibility is the 
denial of social value to personal 
autonomy and privacy. In communitar- 
ian societies the state (or traditional 
authorities), as the representative of soci- 
ety, must control family life, religion, 
education, and all other potentially inde- 
pendent aspects of life. Any institution 
that might influence or challenge the 
reigning regime and its ideology must be 
eradicated, or at least regulated; often 
one's very beliefs, and certainly all aspects 
of one's behavior, are treated as legitimate 
matters for social regulation. 
When personal autonomy is thus 
denied-even repressed as a threat to soci- 
ety-moral equality must also be denied; 
some people-those who "fit in"-are 
treated as more worthy of concern or 
respect than others. The full range of in- 
ternational human rights must thereby be 
violated. 
The rule of law and procedural due pro- 
cess are obviously incompatible with such 
regimes; pursuit of the community's 
substantive goals overrides "mere pro- 
cedures." Due process is also rejected 
because it suggests that political organs 
representative of the full community 
might treat citizens unfairly, a possibility 
denied by the communitarian premise of 
the regime. Equal protection of the laws, 
and nondiscrimination more broadly, 
also are incompatible with communitar- 
ian regimes. In fact, positive discrimina- 
tion against social deviants is essential to 
the political pursuit of unity; differences 
between individuals or groups (other than 
those that are officially sanctioned) are 
not to be protected-let alone valued as 
expressions of autonomy-but rather re- 
pressed, or at best ignored. In communi- 
tarian regimes, one is entitled to the pro- 
tection of the laws and a guaranteed share 
of social resources and opportunities only 
to the extent that one fits within certain 
substantive, ideologically defined 
categories. 
Political participation is similarly 
restricted, both in its substance and its 
participants. Debate over fundamental 
social and political aims cannot be al- 
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Table 1. Social Conceptions of Human Dignity: A Typology 
Autonomy vs. Conflict vs. Repression Valuation Equality vs. 
Regime Type Role Fulfillment Consensus of Outsiders of Privacy Hierarchy 
Liberal Autonomy Conflict No High Equality 
Minimal Autonomy Conflict No (7) Very high Hierarchy 
Traditional Roles Consensus Yes Very low Hierarchy 
Communist Roles Consensus Yes Very low Equality 
Corporatist Roles Consensus Yes Low Hierarchy 
Developmental Roles Consensus Yes (7) Low Equality 
lowed, because they are already set by 
tradition or the reigning ideology. Like- 
wise, politics is dominated by a small 
elite, chosen by ascription, restricted 
party membership, or other nondemo- 
cratic means-or, where the forms of 
democratic politics are utilized (e.g., com- 
munism), real control lies elsewhere (e.g., 
a vanguard party). 
Many communitarian societies, 
however, do perform relatively well in 
providing the substance of economic 
rights. Many espouse, and some do 
achieve, relative equality of material cir- 
cumstances and a basic floor of material 
security. But such economic "rights" are 
mere benefits, contingent on approved 
membership in the political community 
and on the performance of social duties. 
Citizens are not entitled to these goods 
and services; at most they may petition 
for them, not claim them as rights. 
Material security certainly is valuable, 
whether it is a right or a privilege, but 
such "security" is precariously insecure in 
the absence of human rights held against 
the state, since it can be taken away as 
easily as it is granted. 
In sum, communitarian regimes fall 
short of the standard of human rights in 
all major areas. Much as liberalism is 
necessarily committed to protecting, im- 
plementing, and fostering the enjoyment 
of the full range of internationally 
recognized human rights, communitarian 
regimes necessarily violate the full range 
of human rights. 
Human Dignity, Human Rights, 
and Political Regimes 
We can pull together this discussion in a 
typology of social conceptions of human 
dignity. Table 1 lists the positions of our 
six types of regimes on five sociopolitical 
variables shown in the discussion above 
to be important to the social definition of 
human dignity. It is immediately apparent 
from the first four columns that these 
regimes fall into two broad classes, in- 
dividualistic (liberal and minimal) regimes 
and communitarian (traditional, com- 
munist, corporatist, and developmental) 
regimes. 
Not surprisingly, the first four variables 
are rather closely related. Society's at- 
titude towards autonomy is especially im- 
portant. A commitment to personal 
autonomy requires accepting a certain 
degree of social conflict, largely precludes 
enforcing the substantive models of belief 
and behavior that are the basis for the 
repression of outsiders, and leaves open a 
considerable realm of valued private ac- 
tivity. Likewise, a stress on role fulfill- 
ment implies a consensual society: roles 
are defined so as to produce consensus 
when properly performed; "outsiders" 
(those without approved or valued roles) 
are repressed; and privacy, which exists 
outside of redefined roles, is not socially 
valued. 
There are, however, no less important 
differences within each of these two 
classes of regimes. Liberalism's commit- 
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Table 2. Social Conceptions of Human Dignity and Human Rights Performance 
Equality or Valuation of Civil and Economic and 
Regime Type Hierarchy Belonging Political Rights Social Rights 
Individualistic Regimes 
Liberal Equality Moderate Yes Yes 
Minimal Hierarchy Very low Yes No 
Communitarian Regimes 
Traditional Hierarchy Very high No Substance only 
Communist Equality High No Substance only 
Corporatist Hierarchy Varies No No (7) 
Developmental Equality Moderate (7) No Substance (7) 
ment to autonomy is matched by a com- 
mitment to equality; human dignity, for 
the liberal, requires the union of auton- 
omy and equality. This commitment to 
equality further strengthens the tendency 
not to repress outsiders, or even to define 
outsider groups other than noncitizens, 
who are ignored rather than repressed. 
In contrast, those at the bottom of the 
minimal state's social hierarchy are denied 
economic and social rights, as a result of 
the absence of a commitment to equality 
and the presence of an extremely high 
valuation of privacy (especially private 
economic activity) under minimalism. 
Thus, they may be seen as indirectly op- 
pressed economic outsiders, and if the 
lower classes attempt to challenge this 
denial of economic and social rights, 
direct repression is likely. Furthermore, 
whereas liberalism merely accepts a cer- 
tain amount of social conflict as an 
unavoidable consequence of personal 
autonomy, and even tempers conflict by 
the pursuit of social and economic equal- 
ity, minimalists tend to view social con- 
flict in no worse than neutral terms, and 
even as desirable competition between 
unequal, atomistic individuals. 
There are also important differences 
among communitarian regimes. For ex- 
ample, there are considerable differences 
in the substantive bases used for the 
definition of social membership and roles. 
The most important differences, though, 
concern the valuation of equality and 
belonging (the obverse of privacy), as we 
can see in Table 2, which correlates the 
major determinants of social conceptions 
of human dignity with the human rights 
performance of each type of regime. 
All communitarian regimes reject civil 
and political rights, which can be recog- 
nized only when individual autonomy is 
valued over role fulfillment. However, 
traditional and communist regimes, one 
hierarchical, the other egalitarian, do pro- 
vide the substance of (at least some) 
economic and social rights (for insiders); 
that is, they provide goods, services, and 
opportunities, but without the power. or 
control that comes with enjoying these 
benefits as rights. The value placed on 
equality then largely determines the range 
and distribution of these benefits. Com- 
munist regimes are committed to pro- 
viding them equally, and in great and ever 
increasing quantity. Hierarchical tradi- 
tional regimes, however, guarantee only a 
minimum floor for all (or at least all but 
chattel slaves, untouchables, and similar 
near-outsider groups). 
Corporatist and developmental 
regimes-again, one hierarchical, the 
other egalitarian-do not generally offer 
even this much. The typical (authori- 
tarian) corporatist regime protects only 
the interests of the ruling coalition 
(although fascist corporatism is likely to 
provide at least some economic and social 
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benefits to all insiders-thus the ques- 
tionable "no" in Table 2). Developmental 
regimes are ideologically committed to 
providing the substance of economic and 
social rights for all (insiders), at least in 
the long run, but since the social composi- 
tion of such regimes usually belies and 
precludes the realization of this commit- 
ment, it remains of at best questionable 
practical significance. 
This suggests that at least as important 
a variable as equality or hierarchy is the 
valuation of belonging. Traditional and 
communist regimes highly value belong- 
ing, and thus provide the substance of 
many social and economic rights to all in- 
siders, while corporatist and develop- 
mental regimes, which do not guarantee 
even the substance of economic and social 
rights, place lower value on a sense of 
belonging. This conclusion is also implied 
by the comparison of liberal and minimal 
regimes. The absence of economic and 
social rights in minimal regimes is ex- 
plained not simply by the absence of a 
social commitment to equality, but also 
by the very low valuation of belonging. 
Only when autonomy, equality, and at 
least a moderately high value on belong- 
ing are combined-as in liberalism-do 
we find a commitment to economic and 
social rights, and not just their substance. 
Only with a commitment to personal 
autonomy will a regime actively protect 
civil and political rights. In other words, 
only in a liberal regime can there be a fun- 
damental political commitment to the full 
range of internationally recognized 
human rights. 
Other social systems may claim to have 
competing views of human rights. They 
do not. Rather, they rest on competing 
views of human dignity, all of which deny 
both the centrality of the individual in 
political society and the (human) rights of 
men and women to make, and have en- 
forced, equal and inalienable civil, 
political, economic, and social claims on 
the state. Only liberalism, understood as 
a regime based on the political right to 
equal concern and respect, is a political 
system based on human rights. 
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